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Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The
Good Prosecutor Meets Brady
Janet C. Hoeffel*
I.

Introduction

On March 2, 1995, Michael Gerardi took Connie Babin out on their
first date to the Port of Call Restaurant in the French Quarter in New
Orleans. After dinner, they were walking toward the car when three
black, teenage boys walked toward them. One teenager approached
Gerardi, who yelled at Babin to run. She did, but turned around to see
the teenager shoot Gerardi in the face. Three weeks later, Babin
positively identified sixteen-year-old Shareef Cousin as the gunman from
a photographic line-up.'
The public pressure to convict was enormous. Most residents of
New Orleans no doubt remember hearing of the crime. An innocent
person, shot in the face after leaving a popular restaurant, evokes the
sentiment that it could have been any one of us. Veteran prosecutor
Roger Jordan was assigned the task of getting the death penalty for the
perpetrator.
At trial, the prosecution's case consisted of Babin's positive
identification and two tentative photographic identifications of Cousin:
one by a cook who had seen three black males loitering nearby about
thirty seconds before the shooting, and the other by a member of a tour
who saw three black men running away after the shooting. The defense
presented a powerful alibi consisting of a videotape of a basketball game
showing Cousin playing basketball the night of the crime. Two
recreation department supervisors, Cousin's coach, and an opposing team
player all testified that the game started and ended late, and the coach
testified that he dropped Cousin at his home at 10:45 p.m. 2 The shooting
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; J.D., Stanford Law School.
The author was an attorney with the D.C. Public Defender Service for six years and with
the Denver criminal defense firm of Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C. for two years.
1. State v. Cousin, 710 So. 2d 1065, 1066-67 (La. 1998).
2. Id. at 1067.
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occurred well before then, and Cousin lived across town from the crime
scene. Nonetheless, the jury convicted Shareef Cousin of first-degree
murder and sentenced him to death. In 1996, he became the youngest
member of Louisiana's death row population.
In his zeal to convict Cousin, Roger Jordan did not inform the
defense that on the night of the murder, Babin told the police that she did
not get a good look at the gunman's face and probably would not be able
to identify him, and that in an interview three days later, she said that she
was not wearing her glasses or contact lenses on the night of the murder
3
and could only see patterns and shapes.
Shareef Cousin was fortunate enough to have the help of the
tenacious, no-holds-barred, bridge-burning capital defense lawyer Clive
Stafford-Smith.
Because of Stafford-Smith's involvement, the
exculpatory evidence was uncovered, leading to the case's ultimate
dismissal and a civil suit against Jordan. Jordan was awarded absolute
immunity, however, and the suit was dismissed. 4 Stafford-Smith had
also referred Jordan to the bar for an ethical violation.
In August 2004, the Louisiana attorney disciplinary board cleared
Roger Jordan of misconduct in connection with the Cousin case. Scores
of judges and lawyers, including defense attorneys and prosecutors,
testified that Jordan was a professional and honest prosecutor.5 Jordan
testified that he withheld the statement because parts of it were
inculpatory, and, therefore, he deemed the statement unhelpful to the
defense. 6 The board held that Jordan "did not act dishonestly or selfishly
and the evidence has established that he acted in good faith and without
intent.",7 Although Jordan testified self-servingly at the hearing that he
now had an "open-file" discovery policy,8 even if that were true, what
incentive does he have to do so?
Although the story of Jordan's "exoneration" angered me and
inspired this article, sadly, I was not remotely shocked. Assuming that
Cousin was innocent of the crime, he is simply another statistic 9 -- one
more story of a prosecutor withholding exculpatory information from the
3. Id. at 1066.
4. See Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003). The withholding of
favorable evidence was a persistent pattern of the prosecutors serving under then Orleans
Parish District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction
of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2100 n. 173 (citing sources for this proposition).
5. Gwen Filosa, Review Board Clears Prosecutor, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 25,
2004.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Death Penalty Information, Innocence: Freed From Death Row, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did= 110 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005)
(listing Cousin's name at number 75).
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defense without consequence.
When the United States Supreme Court pronounced and refined a
due process violation for the failure to disclose exculpatory information
to the defense, it expressed faith that "the prudent prosecutor will resolve
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure"' and that "a prosecutor
anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable
piece of evidence."'" To the contrary, suppression of evidence favorable
to the accused is a system-wide norm which is accepted and condoned
legally, ethically, and socially. It is not merely the practice of the
ignorant or the miscreant, but a widespread phenomenon.
The way in which the Supreme Court has chosen to define the
prosecutorial duty to disclose favorable evidence gives the prosecution
broad discretion to withhold favorable evidence. 12 The usual debate over
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion circles around prosecutors'
overwhelming and unilateral power to screen, charge, and define
sentences for criminal defendants.' 3 The Brady doctrine,' 4 however,
presents an entirely different brand of prosecutorial discretion. I call it
"core discretion" because it occurs at the core, or the heart, of the
prosecutor's role as an advocate. Through core discretion, the prosecutor
can unilaterally decide that the jury will never hear relevant evidence
helpful to the defense. It is discretion to limit and frame the defense
presentation.
Why does the Court allow, and in fact endorse, this discretion?
Why do prosecutors, even good prosecutors, err on the side of
nondisclosure despite the presence of an ethical obligation to disclose?
This article suggests the answers to these questions lie in the exultation
of the prosecutorial role as zealous advocate and the systemic
devaluation of claims of innocence.
I begin by discussing the
expectation that the "ethical" prosecutor is a realizable model for the
"good" prosecutor. Such an expectation is a pipe dream. Rather, the
10. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
11. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995).
12. The legal standard governing disclosure of favorable information "must
accordingly be seen as leaving the government with a degree of discretion." Kyles, 514
U.S. at 437.
13. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REv. 505 (2001); H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation
of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1695 (2000); Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,88 GEO. L.J. 207
(2000); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851 (1995);
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PrrT. L. REv. 393 (1992); James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraintof ProsecutorialPower,94 HARV. L. REv. 1521 (1981).
14. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Court identified the withholding
of material evidence favorable to the defense as a due process violation.
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good prosecutor in our adversarial system of justice, as designed and
encouraged, is the zealous advocate. Relying on the image of the
prosecutor as "doing justice" distracts from finding a real solution to the
problem of nondisclosure.
The practice of withholding favorable
evidence is encouraged by the courts and the guardians of ethics.
Assuming disclosure of favorable evidence is a goal to be achieved, it is
virtually impossible to envision a solution that works within our
adversarial system of justice. This article recommends looking across
the Atlantic for a model that challenges our assumption that an office of
public prosecution is essential to a "good" system of justice.
II.

The Good Prosecutor as Ethical Prosecutor

Who is a "good" prosecutor is an intensely value-laden judgment.
As a defense attorney, I thought the good prosecutor was the one who
gave me a break now and then, did not seem to take the case personally,
and exhibited some humanity toward my client. The public likely thinks
the good prosecutor is the one who puts the most people behind bars for
the longest time. Certainly that is how prosecutors are elected. The
prosecutor's office likely thinks that the good prosecutor is the one who
works quickly, disposing of as many cases as possible through plea
bargains.
Legal scholars, being the ivory-tower thinkers that we are, tend to
coalesce around an image of the good prosecutor as the "ethical"
prosecutor. The "ethical" prosecutor literally follows the letter of the
ethics code and pays particular attention to the code provisions directly
addressing the prosecutorial role. First and foremost, the prosecutor has
an obligation to "do justice. ' 5 The Court's only extended discussion of
this duty to "do justice" was in the lofty phrasing of Berger v. United
States:
The United States attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
15. The prosecutorial role as a "minister ofjustice" is set out in the comment to Rule
3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt
is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8 cmt. (2004). See also Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, 14 GEO.
J.LEGAL ETHics 309, 314 (2001) (suggesting that prosecutorial duty to truth comes from
role as minister of justice, Brady duty, domination of the system, monopoly of factfinding, and role as representative of the government).
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peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
16
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.
Although the standard is nebulous, it must have content above and
beyond the ethical duties of all other lawyers because it applies to
prosecutors alone. Fred Zacharias has formulated a concept of "doing
justice" that gives it such content. He has suggested that a prosecutor's
duty before trial is to screen out the innocent, and, once at trial, to ensure
that the basic elements of an adversary system exist. 17 Hence, a
prosecutor who sees a defense attorney sleeping through his client's trial,
for example, should18bring this to the court's attention, rather than simply
marvel at the sight.
The professional codes are clear about one aspect of the requirement
to do justice. It is the prosecutor's ethical duty to "make timely
disclosure to the defense all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense."' 19 Therefore, the good "ethical" prosecutor discloses this
evidence. A former prosecutor-turned-judge calls it the "ouch test": "If a
prosecutor is looking at [his or her] case and says 'Ouch, that hurts,' that
means it should be turned over to the defense. Basically, anything that
hurts the prosecution's case is arguably favorable to the defense., 20 Or,
in the words of an Assistant United States Attorney, "when you are
looking at Brady, if you have to think about
whether it should be
21
disclosed, it probably needs to be disclosed.",
16.

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

17. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can
ProsecutorsDo Justice? 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 49 (1991).

18. See id. at 68-74 (discussing prosecutor's duty when defense underperforms).
19. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004). See also MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-103(B) (1983)
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall
make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if
he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or
other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
Id.
A prosecutor should not intentionally to fail to make timely disclosure to
the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all
evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigate as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the
punishment of the accused.
A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, STANDARD 3-3.11 (a).
20. The Honorable Gerrilyn G. Brill, Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of
Georgia and former Assistant United States Attorney, comments published in Panel
Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 781, 793 (1999)

(hereinafter Panel Discussion).
21. Art Leach, Assistant United States Attorney, comments published in Panel
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Scholars hope and expect most prosecutors will think and operate in
accordance with these principles. This expectation is skewed by the fact
that many of the legal scholars writing in the area of prosecutorial
discretion are former Assistant United States Attorneys ("AUSA"s).22 It
is enormously important to point out that neither an AUSA nor a former
AUSA-turned-academic is an average prosecutor. The typical AUSA
has graduated from a good law school near the top of his class. He 23 did
not simply want to be a prosecutor; he wanted to be a federal prosecutor.
Federal prosecutors are an elite group with enormous prestige. The
young Assistant receives training, has a supervisor, and has an army of
federal agents at his disposal. It does not take long for him to realize the
incredible power of his position. The federal prosecutor has virtually
unchecked discretion to screen, charge, and determine the sentence of the
defendants who are at his mercy.
Hence, the federal prosecutor has a vested interest in seeing himself
as just. Gifted with all of the prestige and power of the office, if forced
to describe himself or his colleagues, he must say he is worthy of the
power. He must show that the public can trust him, or he will be forced
to cede his discretion. While former-AUSAs-tumed-academics are more
reflective about the amount of power and discretion given to the office,
and are more understanding of the dangers of abuse, at bottom, they
believe the "ethical prosecutor" exists and can be cultivated. For
example, Bruce Green, a former AUSA, and Fred Zacharias express
some confidence that:
Sometimes, we can trust prosecutors to behave ethically. We get this
notion from two sources. First, as government officials, we hope and
expect that prosecutors will serve the government's interests, which
in the law enforcement context include "justice." Second, we know
that lawyers who choose careers in law enforcement rather than the
more lucrative private sector
often make that choice because of a
24
desire to serve the public.
Green and Zacharias believe that because of the federal prosecutor's
"perception of independence" and "sense of moral superiority," he tends
Discussion, supra note 20, at 806.

22. For example, a quick scan of faculty bios revealed that Stephanos Bibas, Ronald
Wright, Tracey Meares, Gerard Lynch, and Bruce Green were all federal prosecutorseither AUSAs or Department of Justice prosecutors.
23. I use "he" instead of "she" for the prosecutor because, while less politically
correct, it is more accurate. My own personal experience as a defense attorney bears this
out, and a Bureau of Justice Statistics Survey found that local prosecutors were seventy
percent male and eighty-eight percent white. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 734 (1996) (citing study).
24. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating FederalProsecutors' Ethics,
55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 449 (2002).
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to self-regulate.
Richard Uviller26 goes so far as to say that he
considers prosecutors to be "by and large the flower of the bar," filled
with the "heady wine" of being told by their superiors, "[d]o only what
you think is right; bend every professional effort to achieve an outcome
that you think best comports with justice within the constraints of the
law. 27 The prosecutor who does so is the good, the worthy, and the
"ethical" prosecutor.28
The federal prosecutor may in fact be in a position to show some
ethical restraint to his prosecutorial zeal. The run-of-the-mill federal
case is a victimless drug or weapons charge that has been sealed up
tightly by federal law enforcement before it reaches his desk. Most of
the cases are slam-dunk convictions. He may need not stretch to the
limit every exercise of discretion and every rule favorable to the
prosecution in order to gain a conviction. 29 Hence, it may be that some
federal prosecutors occasionally serve the role of an "ethical" prosecutor,
but this image, I submit, is far from reality.
III.

The Good Prosecutor as Worthy Adversary

I have a different vision of the good prosecutor because in my eight
years as a criminal defense attorney, I met many prosecutors in different
jurisdictions, and I never met the "ethical" prosecutor, in the sense
envisioned by the ethics code.
Most crimes are handled by local prosecutors,3 ° who hail from a
very different place than federal prosecutors.
The typical state
25. Id. at 450.
26. While Richard Uviller was a New York County prosecutor, and not an AUSA,
his practice was during the late 1950s and 1960s, when prosecutors' offices were a
kinder, gentler version of their current incarnation.
27. Uviller, supra note 13, at 1702.
28. See also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2131 (1998) (Lynch was a former AUSA) ("The prosecutor in
particular does not see herself as an interested party seeking personal advantage, or even
as a representative of the narrow interests of another. Rather, she will typically define
herself as a public official, seeking 'justice' or 'the public interest."'); id. at 2150 ("[W]e
should not be entirely cynical about the possibility that government officials can conduct
themselves with fairness and in the broadest public interest ...it is a simple fact that
most do.").
29. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements:
Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 651 (1999) (survey of AUSA practices
showed most gave witness statements earlier than required under Jencks Act); Milton C.
Lee, Jr., Criminal Discovery: What Truth Do We Seek? 4 U.D.C. L. REV. 7, 15 (1998)
(citing ABA survey where sixty-six percent of AUSAs responding reported giving more
discovery than required under the federal rules) (citation omitted).
30. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548, 2565-66 (2004) (noting federal government is a
relatively smaller player; federal prisons house nearly 160,000 inmates, while state
penitentiaries and jails house 1.9 million inmates) (citation omitted).
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prosecution is much messier than a federal prosecution. The police work
is sloppier, the resources are limited, and the case loads are heavy. In
many of the crimes, victims push for prosecution, the press follows every
homicide or rape, and the boss needs a high record of convictions for reelection. 31 The typical local prosecutor does not have the luxury, the
time, or the inclination to draw his sense of power from exercising
discretion in favor of the defendant. He will only be noticed, climb the
career ladder, or become a member of elected office himself if he racks
up the convictions.
The local prosecutor has plenty of power: power to pursue or
dismiss charges, power to offer pleas and immunity, power of superior
information, power of reputation, and power of lording it over the guilty,
the pitiful, and the shamed. I never met a prosecutor who did not love
the power he was able to cultivate. I have come to believe it is a matter
of human nature rather than a despicable display: no rational human
being can resist the temptation to enjoy and pursue this power. And it is
not like the power of teacher over student, where the teacher may be
inclined to show mercy toward the student. Rather, the prosecutor is
placed in an adversarial process, in which he must pursue his side with
adversarial zeal if the process is to work as designed. He has little
problem mustering this zeal because he, the public, and the courts
believe he wears the white hat. The combination of power and white hat
justice form the intoxicating milieu of the prosecutor's office.
The prosecutor does not even think about "doing justice" in the
sense the ethics professors envision. What prosecutor would not believe
he is doing justice by fulfilling his concomitant duty to be a zealous
advocate? 32 Isn't the whole idea of becoming a prosecutor to put the bad
guys behind bars and keep the public safe? And didn't the prosecutor
sign up for an adversarial system of justice? Most prosecutors would be
surprised to find out that the admonishment to "do justice" involves
keeping one eye on the defendant's rights. 33 In an adversarial system of
justice, one would think that is the defendant's lawyer's responsibility:

31.

See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV.

323, 330 (2004) (finding prosecutors face pressure mostly from victims and a public
concerned about becoming victims); id. at 342 (noting street crime risks are more "vivid"
than corporate crime causing more public demand for harsh punishment and full
prosecution) (citation omitted).
32.

See Abbe Smith, Can You Be A Good Person and A Good Prosecutor? 14 GEO.

J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 378 (2001) ("[W]hat prosecutor doesn't think that he or she is
'seeking justice,' doing 'right,' or doing 'good'? ... [T]oo often righteousness becomes
self-righteousness.") (citation omitted).
33. See Zacharias, supra note 17, at 52 ("The codes are concerned specifically with
structuring adversarial practice. They do not exempt prosecutors from the requirement of
zealous advocacy.").

20051

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AT THE CORE

"asking prosecutors simultaneously to advocate within a process and
assure that the process is fair is inherently contradictory-and perhaps
hopeless. 34 The general feeling is that defendants and their attorneys
are slimy, guilty cohorts, 35 and the idea of helping the defense seems
almost antithetical to justice. Once the adversarial process has begun, we
should fully expect the normal, human, and good prosecutor to have the
single-minded goal of winning the case for the prosecution.36 That is the
prosecutor our system of justice cultivates and encourages.
I have come to believe that the good prosecutor, if one exists, is the
worthy adversary. He is "zipped, buckled, and helmeted into [his] flight
suit ' 37 from the moment he is handed the case file, with the exception of
a few older prosecutors who have been around the block enough times to
have mellowed. 38 The good prosecutor pursues convictions above all
else. 39 Discovery from the good prosecutor is not free-flowing, motions
hearings are hard-fought, and plea bargains are take-it or leave-it. If the
case is weak, the good prosecutor does not believe it is because the
defendant is innocent. It simply means the prosecution cannot muster the
proof and must plead the case to gain a conviction. If the case is weak
but high profile, the good prosecutor takes the case to trial because the
public demands it, and his reputation depends upon winning it.40 The
good prosecutor is well-prepared, fights hard, and gives up little ground.
34. Id. at 104. The dual obligation was highlighted in Berger v. United States: "[The
prosecutor] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." 295 U.S. at 88.
35. See Smith, supra note 32, at 357 ("Defenders become accustomed to having our
morals challenged; it is an occupational hazard.") (citation omitted).
36. See Zacharias, supra note 17, at 107 ("[T]he codes expect prosecutors to
accomplish the balance of roles in the setting least conducive to reflective thought.
Nowhere do lawyers' competitive juices flow more freely than at trial. Winning is at a
premium.").
37. Uviller, supra note 13, at 1696.
38. Accord Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REv. 2463, 2475 (2004) ("New prosecutors may be systematically harsher,
while veterans may mellow with time.") (citation omitted).
39. See Smith, supra note 32, at 390 ("The pressure [to win] is both external, the
result of the inherently political nature of prosecution, and internal, the result of policies
relating to salary and promotion.") (citation omitted); Meares, supra note 13, at 900
("The prosecutor's professional success inevitably is linked to success at trial and on
appeal. Winning trials and appeals is rewarded by promotions over time. Even more
important than office promotions may be the respect and admiration of her peers that the
prosecutor acquires when she wins cases."); Zacharias, supra note 17, at 108
("Prosecutors who restrain themselves may convict at a lower rate and thus appear less
competent to their superiors."); Bibas, supra note 38, at 2471 ("Favorable win-loss
statistics boost prosecutors; egos, their esteem, their praise by colleagues, and their
prospects for promotion and career advancement.").
40. See Stuntz, supra note 30, at 2563 (arguing that public pressure has prosecutors
taking most murder cases to trial leading to a higher acquittal rate for murders than other
felonies) (citation omitted).
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In other words, the good prosecutor is the star of the prosecutor's office
and the defense attorney's worst nightmare.
IV.

Brady and the Good Prosecutor

If the good prosecutor were the ethical prosecutor, he would
disclose to the defense all information favorable to the defense, without
hesitation. He would seek such information from any government
official who touched the case. If in doubt, he would err on the side of
disclosure. Consistent with "doing justice," such disclosure ensures that
the adversarial process is fair. In reality, however, the good prosecutor
must do none of these things to be a worthy adversary, according to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
It may be that the Warren Court originally intended to place the
prosecutor in the ethical role. In Brady v. Maryland, the Court broke
new ground by holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or the bad faith of the prosecution., 41 By
every indication, the term "material" was used consistently with the
Black's Law Dictionarydefinition as "significant" and "essential. 'A2 The
Court did not analyze the evidence withheld in Brady--a confession by
the co-defendant that he committed the murder-based on its prejudicial
value, or how it would have affected the outcome of the case. Rather,
the Court simply referred to its prior holdings in a way that made it
appear that the suppression of the favorable evidence itself amounted to. a
due process violation.43 The Court emphasized the role of the ethical
prosecutor, saying that "[a] prosecution that withholds evidence on
demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate
him or reduce the penalty ...

casts the prosecutor in the role of an

architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of
justice[.]" 44 Hence "[s]ociety wins not only
when the guilty are
45
convicted but when criminal trials are fair[.],,
In any event, this view of the good prosecutor as the ethical
prosecutor was undone by the march of United States v. Agurs,46 United
41.

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

42.
43.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 991

(7th ed. 1999).

The Court summarized Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), Pyle v.

Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), as
simply holding that presenting false testimony or allowing it to go uncorrected amounted
to a due process violation. The Court did not mention a prejudice test. 373 U.S. at 8687.
44. 373 U.S. at 87-88.
45. Id. at 87.
46. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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States v. Bagley,47 and Kyles v. Whitley.48 Agurs began the process of

incorporating a prejudice component into the trial standard; Bagley
refined it. In Bagley, the Court held that favorable evidence is
"material," and constitutional error results from its suppression, "if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different., 49 This
standard reinforced the image of the good prosecutor as the worthy
advocate. 50 Remarkably, the Court incorporated the prejudice showing
that must be made on appeal into the standard to be applied by the
players at trial, saying in Agurs, "[1]ogically, the same standard must
apply at both times." 5' Logically?
Typically, the analysis of a violation of defendant's constitutional
rights proceeds in a two-step process. First, was there a constitutional
error; and second, was that error prejudicial such that reversal is
required? For example, if a trial court admits hearsay evidence which
violates the right to confrontation, constitutional error is present. Only
upon appeal will the appellate court, looking at the entire record, decide
whether the error was harmless. 52 The different standard of error at trial
encourages the prosecution and the court to avoid error, and the issue of
whether that error is harmless is best left to the appellate court having the
benefit of the entire record on appeal.
Instead, Bagley directly places the prosecutor in the role of the
architect of the proceeding. The prosecutor can withhold the evidence if
he or she believes there would not be a reasonable probability that the
disclosure would have affected the jury's verdict. In the words of the
Court in Kyles, it is a legitimate exercise of the prosecutor's discretion:
While the definition of Bagley materiality.., must accordingly be

seen as leaving the government with a degree of discretion, it must
47.

473 U.S. 667 (1985).

48.

514 U.S. 419 (1995).

49.

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.

50. I am inclined to agree with John Douglass, who wrote that "the Court's narrow
view of 'materiality' under Brady has been one of the largest disappointments of the last
quarter century." John G. Douglass, FatalAttraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady
and Plea Bargaining,50 EMORY L.J. 437, 442 (2001).

51. 427 U.S. at 108. In Bagley, the Court relegates to a footnote its reasoning that "a
rule that the prosecutor commits error by any failure to disclose evidence favorable to the
accused, no matter how insignificant, would impose an impossible burden on the
prosecutor and would undermine the interest in the finality of judgments." 473 U.S. at
675 n.7. It is hard to imagine what is so impossible about reviewing the file and turning
over evidence that tends to exculpate the accused.
52. For example, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the admission
against the defendant of the testimonial statement of a witness where the defendant had
not had an opportunity for cross-examination was a violation of the Confrontation
Clause. Whether it was reversible error was a secondary inquiry.
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also be understood as imposing a corresponding burden. On the one
side, showing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable
evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady
violation, without more. But the prosecution, which alone can know
what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility
to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence and make
the
53
disclosure when the point of "reasonable probability" is reached.
Calling that responsibility a "burden" is like calling the police officer's
discretion to stop and frisk based on a "reasonable suspicion" rather than
according to bright line rules a "burden."
The rational prosecutor
welcomes that "burden" over a rule requiring that he turn over all
favorable information. His duty is discretionary and greatly reduced:
"[A]bsent a constitutional violation, there4 was no breach of the
prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose.,1
Furthermore, the Court in Bagley adopted a standard for appellate
review that also reinforced the good prosecutor as worthy advocate and
not as ethical prosecutor. The usual appellate standard for constitutional
violations encourages avoiding the error in the first instance. Under
5 5
Chapman v. California,
if a constitutional error has occurred, then the
beneficiary of the error-the prosecution-has the burden of showing
beyond a reasonable doubt that the absence of the error would not have
changed the outcome of the trial.5 6 By lowering the prejudice standard
on appeal and shifting the burden of proof to the defense, the Court in
Bagley furthered the entrenchment of the prosecutorial exercise of
discretion in favor of withholding the evidence.
The Court's admonishments that "the prudent prosecutor will
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure ' 5 7 and that "a
prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a
favorable piece of evidence, 58 are either ignorant or disingenuous. The
prudent prosecutor will do no such thing. The Court's use of the word
"prudent" here connotes the prosecutor who wants to seal a conviction
and would not engage in behavior that risks the security of that
conviction. However, the Court's holdings have set up exactly the
opposite incentive.5 9
53. 514 U.S. at 437.
54. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107-08.
55. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
56. In Bagley, Justice Marshall called for the Chapman standard of review in dissent.
473 U.S. at 696 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108.
58. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
59. See Gershman, supra note 13, at 439 ("[B]y avoiding any inquiry into the
prosecutor's culpability, and focusing entirely on the materiality of the evidence, the
Court encourages prosecutors, even ethical prosecutors, to withhold evidence.").
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For example, imagine that the prudent prosecutor is in possession of
information that one of the two eyewitnesses to a robbery initially gave
the police a description of the perpetrator of the crime that was
inconsistent with the appearance of the defendant. The eyewitness
described the person as 5'8" tall, with a medium build. The defendant is
5'11" tall and thin.
That same eyewitness, however, picked the
defendant out of a lineup and indicated she was sure that the defendant
was the robber. The other eyewitness gave a general description that fit
the defendant and also picked the defendant out of a lineup. The prudent
prosecutor, convinced of the defendant's guilt, will not disclose that
information.
Several rational reasons explain this decision. First, he is convinced
of the defendant's guilt and he is certain that a defense attorney will use
this information to attempt to create reasonable doubt where none exists.
The prudent prosecutor believes people misgauge the actual height and
weight of a person for many reasons, and a minor discrepancy should not
derail the prosecution. Second, the prudent prosecutor has read Bagley
and Kyles and realizes he has discretion to wait to disclose until he feels
a reasonable probability exists that the information would change the
outcome of the case. 60 He does not believe this inconsistency
creates a
61
reasonable probability, and who is to fault his discretion?
Third, the prudent prosecutor also knows that, because he has no
obligation to disclose this evidence, it may never be discovered and,
62
therefore, will never make its way into an appeal of the conviction.
Fourth, he knows that even if it is discovered post-trial, an appellate
court is likely to view this evidence as harmless in hindsight.6 3 The
burden will be on the defendant and appellate courts have shown

60. See American College of Trial Lawyers, ProposedCodification of Disclosure of
FavorableInformation Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 93, 104 (2004) [hereinafter Proposed Codification] ("This Committee, a
majority of whose members practice in the federal courts, believes that across the country
federal prosecutors routinely defer Brady disclosure unless ordered by the trial court.").
61. See, e.g., Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271, 1272-74 (5th Cir. 1976) (where
prosecutor withheld the fact that shortly after the robbery, the victim described the robber
as 6'1" and slender, whereas Garrison was 5'5" and stocky, court found that "[t]he
categories of the report [were] not in themselves exculpatory" but "merely indicate[d]
that the victim may have previously offered a somewhat different version of the crime.").
62. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 24, at 470 (arguing prosecutors are less likely
to self-regulate when there is a lower likelihood of the misconduct becoming known);
Meares, supra note 13, at 909 (stating it is "probably fair to say that many instances of
Brady-type misconduct are never discovered and hence never reported").
63.

See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady

Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 707-08 (1987) ("[A] prosecutor knows
that a decision to withhold or falsify evidence, even if discovered, will not necessarily
result in a reversal of the conviction.").
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themselves to be predisposed to upholding convictions. 64 The remote
prospect of a reversal at some point in the future is hardly a deterrent
now, when faced with a discretionary decision which will help him get a
conviction.65 In any case, a reversal simply calls for a retrial, so that the
prosecutor is put in essentially the same position he was in prior to the
error.

66

Fifth, the prudent prosecutor is unconcerned about an ethical
violation.67 Even assuming the prosecutor is aware of his duty to
disclose favorable evidence under the professional codes (which may be
a stretch 68 ), he has never heard of a prosecutor being disciplined for his
exercise of discretion in withholding evidence. In 1987, Richard Rosen
combed the universe of written disciplinary decisions and found only
nine which even involved a referral of a prosecutor for withholding
exculpatory evidence. In only one of those was the prosecutor given a

64. See Meares, supra note 13, at 900-01 (arguing that the effectiveness of a reversal
as a sanction is "tempered greatly" by the harmless error rule, as appellate courts
regularly uphold convictions in the face of prosecutorial misconduct); Douglass, supra
note 50, at 472 ("[R]eview after-the-fact will almost never be as generous to a defendant
as judicial consideration of a disclosure issue before trial."); Gershman, supra note 13, at
425 (arguing that harmless error rule "informs prosecutors that they can weigh the
commission of evidentiary or procedural violations not against a legal or ethical standard
of appropriate conduct, but rather, against an increasingly accurate prediction that the
appellate courts will ignore the misconduct when sufficient evidence exists to prove the
defendant's guilt."); Barbara Babcock, Evidence Favorableto an Accused and Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1154-55 (1982) (stating lower courts
never find impeachment evidence material). See also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 58889 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[A]n automatic application of the harmless error
review in case after case, and for error after error, can only encourage prosecutors to
subordinate the interest in respecting the Constitution to the ever-present and always
powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular case.").
65. See Rosen, supra note 63, at 731-32 (arguing that weighed against the fairly
nonexistent incentives to refrain from a Brady violation "is the instant, concrete
advantage of gaining a conviction.").
66. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 24, at 403-04 (suggesting that reversals do
not deter prosecutors because there are no consequences to the individual prosecutorappellate reversals rarely identify the misbehaving prosecutor by name, and reversals
may occur after the prosecutor has left office).
67. The prosecutor can also rest easy about a civil suit. In Imbler v. Pachtman,424
U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that prosecutors are not subject to civil actions
for damages arising from their wrongful conducts as advocates, including Brady
violations.
68. For example, the American College of Trial Lawyers expressed that federal
prosecutors do not appear to understand their duty. Proposed Codification, supra note
60, at 103-04 ("A number of prosecutors have interpreted Brady narrowly and believe
that a prosecutor's Brady obligation is limited solely to turning over information that
someone other than the defendant has confessed to the crime at issue. Many prosecutors
do not focus on the critical language of the Brady decision, which required disclosure of
evidence that tends to exculpate or reduce one's penalty ....
Still others do not view
Giglio or impeachment material as part of the Brady exculpatory disclosure obligation.").
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major sanction, and then, only a suspension. 69 The message sent is that,
although it is a rule on the books, the disciplinary authorities do not
believe its violation worthy of condemnation.
The barriers to enforcement of the ethical rule are enormous. First,
a third party must have the time, wherewithal, and inclination to refer the
prosecutor. The only third party who might have an interest is a
defendant, who likely is focused on reversing his conviction and does not
70
have the resources to engage an attorney to handle the ethical claim.
Even if referred, all incentives point in favor of letting the prosecutor off
the hook. If the appellate courts have already determined that the
nondisclosure did not amount to a constitutional violation, it is unlikely
that the ethical board or the overseeing court will find fault with the
prosecutor, despite a technical violation of the rules. 71 Politics,
separation of powers, and judicial restraint all play a role.72
Even if an appellate court did find a constitutional violation,
political and societal pressures demand exoneration. Take Roger Jordan,
for example: defense attorneys, judges and prosecutors all felt compelled
to defend him. Who is going to be responsible for taking down an active
prosecutor? And if that prosecutor is not active anymore, why bother?
In Roger Jordan's case, the disciplinary authorities also seemed to
require malicious intent to withhold the evidence, a standard that will be
impossible to show in the course of a discretionary decision. It is a nod
to adversarial zeal. The prosecutor was not malicious-he was simply
fulfilling his role to interpret the law and the facts in a manner most
consistent with convicting the guilty.
Is the prosecutor blameworthy for thinking in these strategic terms?
The vision of the good prosecutor as the "ethical" prosecutor says yes.
When we view Roger Jordan's behavior in the abstract, it seems
despicable, unconscionable, and perverse. 7 But Roger Jordan simply
69. See Rosen, supra note 63, at 730 (finding that, of the other eight, three resulted
in no disciplinary action, four received minor sanctions-one reprimand, one caution and
two censures-and one was on appeal).
70. Id. at 694, 734 (stating that criminal defendants rarely have incentives or
resources to pursue complaints to the bar).
71. For example, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for Louisiana is not a neutral
observer, but an employee of the Louisiana Supreme Court, further entrenching the bias
to affirm.
72. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L.
REv. 721, 757-62 (2001) (barriers to enforcement include that prosecutorial misconduct
is more typically driven by "an excess of zeal in pursuing the public good"; there are
alternative remedies such as appellate reversal; the bar may feel politically constrained as
state prosecutors are elected officials; and individual prosecutors who commit
misconduct may no longer be prosecutors by the time the bar acts, so there is no need for
specific deterrence).
73. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, he should have been disbarred and hung out to dry.

1148

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:4

did what the adversarial system-and the Supreme Court-directed,
invited, and encouraged him to do. We need to shift the critique away
from the prosecutor and onto the system. The description of the
prosecutor's behavior as misconduct marginalizes it, makes it seem less
than mainstream, and suggests that the solution simply lies in
encouraging badly behaving prosecutors to be good.
Withholding favorable evidence, however, seems to be the norm.
One recent study reported that convictions in 381 homicide cases
nationwide had been reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence
suggesting the defendants' innocence or presented evidence they knew to
be false.74 Of the first seventy exonerations of prisoners through DNA
testing nationwide, 34% involved prosecutorial misconduct; 75 and of the
instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the 152 exonerations occurring
between 1989 and 2004,76 37% were due to the suppression of
exculpatory evidence.7 7 These, of course, are only the cases where
somehow the nondisclosure came to light. Most cases of nondisclosure
likely go undiscovered.
Good reason exists to believe that nondisclosure pre-plea is
rampant. Since the Supreme Court held in United States v. Ruiz 78 that
disclosure of Brady information pre-plea is not constitutionally
mandated, prosecutors have received the green light to withhold the
information. Considering that in the weakest cases the prosecutor is
likely most interested in obtaining a plea,7 9 these cases are the ripest for
the existence of favorable evidence and for conviction of an innocent
defendant. 80 Nonetheless, the message from the Supreme Court is that
74. Gershman, supra note 15, at 312-13.
75. See Innocence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/index.php
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005) (the Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law is a non-profit legal clinic handling cases where post-conviction DNA testing can

lead to conclusive proof of innocence).
76. See id. at http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display-cases.php?sort=yearexoneration (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
77. See id. at http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/policemisconduct.php (last
visited Feb. 11, 2005).
78. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
79. See Vorenberg, supra note 13, at 1535 (pointing out that prosecutors may offer
the greatest incentives to defendants with the greatest chance for acquittal).
80. See Bibas, supra note 38, at 2473 (arguing that a prosecutor can "shade weak
trials, police misconduct, and credible claims of innocence from view" by bargaining
them away); id. at 2495 (claiming that prosecutorial bluffing is effective against innocent
defendants, who are on average more risk averse than guilty); Kevin C. McMunigal,
Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 995 (1989)
(expecting that Brady cases will tend to be resolved by plea negotiation); id. at 992
(finding that questionable guilt, strong inducements to plead guilty, and overestimation of
the government's chances for conviction in Brady cases increases risk of convictions of
innocent defendants through pleas); Douglass, supra note 50 (arguing that the accuracy
of plea of guilty is implicated by Brady withholding); Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy
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convictions through pleas are to be encouraged and that the good
prosecutor should do nothing to reduce his chances of getting a plea
bargain in a weak case.
Therefore, we have a criminal justice system which encourages
adversarial zeal in its prosecutors to the tune of withholding favorable
evidence. To hold our noses at such conduct on the part of prosecutors is
unrealistic. To blame the prosecutor ignores fundamental problems
inherent in our adversarial system of justice that assumes the average
criminal defendant is guilty and encourages prosecutors to pursue
convictions in the name of justice.
V.

Is the Good Prosecutor Right?

The discussion thus far has proceeded from an assumption we might
question: that disclosure of favorable evidence is good. Given the
Supreme Court's indifference, if not hostility, to the ethical duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence, and the ethics boards' ignorance of the
claims, are we off base? Should the presumed ethical norm be discarded
in favor of the legal and societal norm?
The answer would seem to lie in the valuation of two benefits that
seem impossible to quantify in any universal terms: fairness and
accuracy. Both would seem to militate in favor of disclosure as a general
rule. But, I suspect prosecutors and courts 81 do not believe it. By and
large, criminal defendants are guilty, and attempts to level the playing
field are simply opportunities for the guilty defendant to take advantage
of the process. Consider Learned Hand's comments eighty years ago:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not
disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when
there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence
against him to pick over at his leisure, and to make his defense fairly
or foully, I have never been able to see.82
That sentiment is alive and well today in the courts. Assuming that the
vast majority of those accused of crime are guilty, 83 giving the defense
Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q.
1 (2002) (same).
81. Most judges were former prosecutors and retain their prosecutorial bias. See
Meares, supra note 13, at 912 (explaining the court bias in favor of prosecutors).
82. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
83. See Smith, supra note 32, at 384 ("Notwithstanding the legal presumption of
innocence, the cultural and institutional presumption in most prosecutors offices is that
everybody is guilty.").
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fodder to create reasonable doubt simply undermines justice.84 For
example, the concern over expanding discovery has always been that it
simply allows the85 defendant to tailor his defense to the evidence and
promotes perjury.
If we could say with some assurance that enforcing the ethical rule
of disclosure would mean that guilty persons go free while innocent
persons are unaffected, then perhaps there would be no need for the rule,
and its current undervaluation and under-enforcement is justified. But,
this assumption has been undone through the advent of DNA testing.
We now know that prosecutors have withheld favorable evidence in
many of the cases where an innocent person was convicted. We have
never had access to such data before. And withholding favorable
evidence goes hand-in-hand with innocence cases. The evidence is most
likely to exist and to be withheld in the weakest cases-guilty pleas and
high stakes cases which the prosecutor must take to trial. Until recently,
no one had to believe the assertion that innocent people were convicted,
although the notion existed. Now, the public imagination has been
captured by the innocence cases that have come to light and that can only
be a small percentage of the wrongfully convicted.
Despite the instincts of the good prosecutor and the formerprosecutor-turned judge that only the guilty benefit from a rule of
disclosure, it appears that the risk of convicting innocent people through
86
withholding of favorable evidence is intolerably high.

84. See Gershman, supra note 15, at 353 ("Because of politics, institutional
pressures, adversarialness, self-righteousness, and arrogance ... prosecutors may
sincerely believe that defendants probably are guilty, will tend to overlook or ignore
exculpatory hypotheses, and will place winning a case above any other litigation value.");
Rosen, supra note 63, at 732 ("It is also likely that in most cases the prosecutor believes
the defendant is guilty, and therefore might be motivated by the concern that, in one
sense, justice will not be served by revealing evidence which will increase the probability
that the defendant will go free."); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's
Misconduct, 23 CRiM. L. BULL. 550, 553-54 (1987) (stating that from a prosecutor's
standpoint, "[h]e cannot believe that he is playing a role in convicting innocent people"
by offering good deals in weak cases; "the prosecutor naturally tends to view weaknesses
in his case not as possible indicators of innocence but merely as a possible failure of
proof.").
85. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution:Sporting Event or Quest
for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 6 (1990) (enumerating those
concerns). That these concerns are alive and well is clear in the comments of Magistrate
Judge Gerrilyn Brill, a former prosecutor, who said that giving the defendant witness
statements in advance of trial meant that "the defendants will become more creative in
creating their own evidence; that it will not, in the long run, lead to the truth." Panel
Discussion, supra note 20, at 814.
86. See Gershman, supra note 13, at 439 ("It is not an understatement to say that
prosecutorial suppression of evidence presents perhaps one of the principal threats to a
system of rational and fair fact-finding.").
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VI. Now What?
It is difficult to envision an effective solution to this enormously
intractable problem. Most of the solutions scholars have proposed,
although noble, will not succeed given our adversarial system of justice
and society's deeply ingrained norms about the proper role of the
prosecutor as zealous advocate.
First, Fred Zacharias proposes simply educating and encouraging
prosecutors to "do justice., 87 It may be true that enormous numbers of
local prosecutors do not really understand Brady or know the ethical
rules of professional conduct. However, it should be obvious by now
that I do not believe that education matters. Even if a prosecutor knows
the rules, he knows that the rules work in his favor. The Brady standard
at trial means that the prosecutor can withhold favorable evidence on the
theory it would not have affected the outcome of the trial, knowing this is
in fact what appellate courts usually find in similar circumstances. The
ethical rules are not enforced. I believe it is impossible to change the
rules of the game simply through education about ethical obligations if
education means an attempt to change the culture of the office through
training and explicit direction.88
Second, legal commentators suggest that ethical violations should
be more vigorously pursued. 89 This suggestion is true enough, but
considering that violations are not so pursued, the question of how to
motivate the would-be motivators remains. As long as prosecutors are
encouraged, directly or indirectly, to seek convictions as the first order of
justice, few are going to step in to discipline them.
Third, of course, the courts could create better legal standards for
the due process violation than those set as the floor in Bagley. The better
standard would require that a due process error occurs at trial if favorable
87. See Zacharias, supra note 17, at 49. See also Kenneth Bresler, 'TNever Lost a
Trial " When ProsecutorsKeep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
537, 546 (1996) (arguing that prosecutors need to be educated to "avoid behavior, such as
score-keeping, that makes criminal trials resemble sporting matches."); Lynch, supra
note 28, at 2149 (maintaining that prosecutors should be trained to approach their
decisions "in a spirit of fairness and neutrality").
88. The most recent suggestion from the Green-Zacharias team is that prosecutors'
offices should develop standards of neutrality to help guide the prosecutors in exercising
their discretion. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004
Wis. L. REv. 837, 904. I find this suggestion far removed from the problem at hand. If
prosecutors do not follow the clear cut ethical standard to disclose exculpatory
information, the problem does not lie in creating clearer standards for "doing justice."
89. See Rosen, supra note 63, at 735-36 (suggesting that bar counsel comb the
appellate cases for Brady violations and institute proceedings themselves and start
punishing more harshly for Brady). See also Zacharias, supra note 72, at 775 (suggesting
that disciplinary authorities may need to consider targeting supervisors who encourage
the "ethos" of the office rather than line attorneys).

1152

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:4

information is withheld. Then, on appeal, the Chapman "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard would apply. 90 Although this
would certainly help to lead to the right results, it still may not deter
prosecutors from withholding the evidence since reversals remain remote
to convictions, both in time and in actuality. The favorable evidence
may never be discovered, and appellate courts will still work hard to find
the error harmless, given their current predisposition.
Fourth, we could consider a policy of qualified immunity, rather
than absolute immunity, in civil suits against prosecutors who knowingly
withhold favorable evidence. Even if that were a realistic option, the
barriers to suit would be practically insurmountable. For the same
reasons defendants do not have the time, wherewithal, and money to
bring a disciplinary action, they will not bring civil suits. Also, civil
liability would mimic the criminal standards for disclosure, so that unless
the appellate court in the criminal case found reversible error, no civil
liability would follow.
Fifth, at the very least, we could make nondisclosure a rule
violation.
Currently, the discovery of favorable evidence appears
nowhere in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, governing discovery
in federal cases, or Rule 11, governing plea bargains. 91 However,
although helpful in terms of educating prosecutors to their
responsibilities, a rule would go no further than that.
Because of the reticence to impose sanctions on the prosecutor, it is
worth considering lesser sanctions that the courts might actually pursue.
For example, if a case is reversed on appeal due to a Brady violation, the
court could order that, on retrial, the defendant should get open
discovery, or a deposition of the witness who was the subject of the
withheld information. The hope is that by putting the prosecutor in a
worse position on retrial, maybe he will reconsider his decision. Even if
the prosecutor did not reconsider, at least the defendant would receive a
benefit. However, such sanctions cannot be mandated, but merely
92
suggested.
Tracey Meares has proposed the innovative idea of financial
incentives to guide prosecutors. However, it is difficult to envision how
that would work in a Brady situation. She proposes that a prosecutor be
90, See also Rosen, supra note 63, at 736 (suggesting a bad faith standard in Brady
cases requiring reversal).
91.

See FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULES 11, 16. See also Proposed

Codification, supra note 60, at 95 (proposing amendments to Rules 11 and 16 to define
favorable information to an accused and require disclosure of information in writing
within 14 days of request).
92. Tracey Meares has pointed out that few courts exercise contempt power against
prosecutors and the Supreme Court has limited the use of the courts' supervisory power
over prosecutorial misconduct. Meares, supra note 13, at 891, 894.
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financially rewarded if his conviction makes it through appellate court
without error. 93 As we have seen, a prosecutor can feel pretty secure
about withholding favorable evidence and making it through appeals
without a finding of error, either because the evidence was never
discovered or because the court found a reasonable probability that the
jurors would still have found the defendant guilty.
The problem with all of the above solutions is that they occur within
the framework of the adversarial system as we know it. Is it at all
possible to envision a change to the system which might make a
difference to the incentives? Although I do not believe this will happen
in my lifetime, I do believe eliminating the institution of the public
prosecutor could be an effective solution. Although we usually consider
that we made progress as a nation by creating a public prosecutor, we
must see that we have created a permanent, vested adversary to the
defendant and his representative. Most prosecutors are worlds apart
from the defense attorneys who are their adversaries. The views of
fairness and justice clash enormously.
In England, the Crown Prosecution Service ("CPS") is the
equivalent of our public prosecutors' offices. However, the CPS
lawyers, who are solicitors, normally retain barristers to conduct the
actual court proceedings in Crown Court. 94 The barristers are private
attorneys with their own practices who may appear for the prosecution
when retained by a CPS lawyer and who may, on another day, appear in
court on behalf of a criminal defendant. 9 Barristers "are therefore
considered more objective and less identified with the parties" '96 than
CPS lawyers. The ethical code that applies to the prosecuting barrister
states that he "should not regard himself as appearing for a party. He
should lay before the Court fairly and impartially the whole of the facts
which comprise the case for the prosecution and should assist the Court
on all matters applicable to the case. 97 Those who have experienced the
English system firsthand confirm that, in fact, the prosecuting barristers
are far less vested and have a far broader perspective on the system than
American prosecutors.9 8 Although the English system appears to be the
unwitting byproduct of the division of duties between solicitors and
93. See id. at 902.
94. This occurs because generally only barristers have a right to appear in Crown
Courts. Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor'sEthical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence
in Police Hands: Lessonsfrom England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 1443 n.329 (2000).
95. See id. at 1442-43 (describing system).
96. Id. at 1443.
97. Id. (quoting Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, Standard 11.1).
98. Conversations with Professor Geoffrey Bennett, Director, Notre Dame London
Law Centre, a co-contributor to this forum; and Richard Bourke, former barrister in
Australia and current capital defense lawyer in Texas.
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barristers, the result is an adversary who is far more likely to have
fairness on his agenda.
Short of a drastic change in the competitive culture of American
prosecution, however, I am left with the sinking feeling that the status
quo will remain until the number of innocent persons wrongfully
convicted reaches a magical number that we, as a nation, decide we
simply cannot tolerate. Unfortunately, representation of the guilty will
never be a popular cause. Hence, for now, the Supreme Court in Ruiz
can fool itself and most everyone else that only a guilty man pleads
guilty, and that the discovery of favorable evidence is an undeserved
windfall to the guilty defendant. The good prosecutor can live a long and
prosperous life with the words of Learned Hand guiding his conscience.

